The talk of the town has been Mazur (or its official title, given the number of interveners, Chartered Institute of Legal Executives (CILEX) & Ors v Mazur & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 369), which is relevant for the question of litigation carried out by those not authorised to conduct litigation. Another topic was discussed briefly in both the submissions and the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
- As I have already mentioned, the parties placed significant reliance on paragraphs 1(7) and 1(8) of schedule 3, which provides an exemption in relation to rights of audience, as follows:
“1 Right of audience
(1) This paragraph applies to determine whether a person is an exempt person for the purpose of exercising a right of audience before a court in relation to any proceedings (subject to paragraph 7).
[…]
(7) The person is exempt if–
(a) the person is an individual whose work includes assisting in the conduct of litigation,
(b) the person is assisting in the conduct of litigation–
(i) under instructions given (either generally or in relation to the proceedings) by an individual to whom sub-paragraph (8) applies, and
(ii) under the supervision of that individual, and
(c) the proceedings are not reserved family proceedings and are being heard in chambers—
(i) in the High Court or county court, or
(ii) in the family court by a judge who is not, or by two or more judges at least one of whom is not, within section 31C(1)(y) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (lay justices).
(8) This sub-paragraph applies to–
(a) any authorised person in relation to an activity which constitutes the conduct of litigation;
(b) any person who by virtue of section 193 is not required to be entitled to carry on such an activity.”
- This exemption applies to individuals whose work includes assisting in the conduct of litigation. If individuals satisfy two conditions, they have a right of audience for proceedings in the High Court or county court heard “in chambers” or for certain family court proceedings. The expression “in chambers” is an out-of-date reference to hearings held in the High Court or county court which were not held in public and were often procedural in nature. They were in the judge’s room, the judge often being a Master (in the High Court) or District Judge (in the county court or District Registry).
- The two conditions in paragraph 1(7)(b) were that the individual must be working under instructions given by another individual and under that individual’s supervision (paragraph 1(7)(b)(i) and (ii)). The individual giving instructions and supervision is defined in paragraph 1(8), which includes the particular unauthorised persons mentioned in section 193(2) of the 2007 Act in relation to the conduct of litigation. Notably the instructions may be given “in relation to the proceedings” or “generally”. The latter in this context must refer to instructions of a more general nature not specific to the proceedings.
- Paragraph 2 of schedule 3 concerns the conduct of litigation. Paragraph 2(3) comprises an exemption for those having a right to conduct litigation under any “enactment” as follows:
This is a topic that has been considered by the Courts, no higher than a Circuit Judge. It could have been considered by the Court of Appeal, but it was remitted back to the County Court to be considered as they believed it to be too academic. Following Mazur, I wonder if the Court of Appeal would be slow to make such a decision.
There have been a flurry of cases, including but not limited to:-
- Shane v Lincoln [2016] (MOJ Stage 3 Hearing)
- Ellis v Larson [2016](MOJ Stage 3 Hearing)
- National Westminster Bank Plc v Smith [2019] (summary judgment application)
- Halborg v Apple (UK) Limited & Another [2022] (which was originally leapfrogged to the Court of Appeal – my commentary on it is here)
- Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Langley [2026] EWCC 1 (which I have written about here)
Today, Cost Lawyer Richie Young published the reserved Judgment of his case of Smart Parking v Young [2026] where, as the Defendant, he successfully argued that the advocate attending did not have a right of audience and secured his costs upto and after the Claimant filed a notice of discontinuance under the unreasonable conduct trigger of CPR 27.14(2)(g).
Facts of the case
The claim involved an alleged parking charge incurred by Mr Young at Cardiff Gate Retail Park on 27th September 2020, with Smart Parking claiming Mr Young overstayed and initially issued a £60 charge, which was later increased to £170 when unpaid. Mr Young stated he only became aware of the debt on 7th June 2025, upon receiving a letter dated 29th May 2025, nearly five years after the alleged breach. Following correspondence, Smart Parking agreed to reduce the charge to £60, which Mr Young paid on 7th August 2025, with both parties accepting this as full and final settlement.
Despite settling the debt, Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd (DCBL) was either unaware of the settlement or chose to ignore it and continued chasing Mr Young. On 24th September 2025, the Defendant warned the Claimant about the consequences of further action, including the possibility of seeking costs. Smart Parking had already issued court proceedings on 8th September 2025, before resolving Mr Young’s queries or acknowledging the settlement, and these proceedings were premature, related to nearly five-year-old events, and pursued despite evidence that the debt was settled. Smart Parking later filed a Notice of Discontinuance on 28th November 2025, two months after Mr Young’s warning.
On the 15th December 2025, Mr Young applied to set aside the discontinuance, strike out the claim as an abuse of process, and recover his LIP costs on an indemnity basis.
Hearing
The matter appeared before DDJ McKay and Mr Young challenged the Claimant’s advocate (Mr Razza) right to appear in the matter. Mr Razza did not have a party present, and therefore could not rely on the The Lay Representatives (Rights of Audience) Order 1999. Therefore Mr Razza attempted to rely on the exemption in Sch 3 Legal Services Act 2007.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant was represented by DCBL’s legal department, which instructed Elms Legal Limited. The Judge correctly identified the test within Sch 3 (7):-
The person is exempt if—
(a)the person is an individual whose work includes assisting in the conduct of litigation,
(b)the person is assisting in the conduct of litigation—
(i)under instructions given (either generally or in relation to the proceedings) by an individual to whom sub-paragraph (8) applies, and
(ii)under the supervision of that individual, and
(c)the proceedings are not reserved family proceedings and are being heard in chambers—
(i)in the High Court or county court, or
(ii)in the family court by a judge who is not, or by two or more judges at least one of whom is not, within section 31C(1)(y) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (lay justices)
The first step was the Judge’s acceptance that Mr Razza was assisting in the conduct of the litigation. He was acting under instructions from Mr Shoreham-Lawson, a qualified solicitor and the principal of ELMS.
The next step was to determine whether the assistance that Mr Razza provided was under the instructions and supervision of someone who was authorised to conduct litigation. This is where Smart Parking hit a roadblock.
ELMS produced a practice note which stated that a person has the right of audience if they are an authorised advocate (such as a solicitor, barrister, or Chartered Legal Executive1) or an exempt person. Edmund Shoreham-Lawson, the Principal of ELMS Legal Ltd, is a qualified solicitor and can act as an advocate. It set out the principle of supervision. However, the Judge was not satisfied that the arrangements of Elms and Mr Shoreham-Lawson were sufficient to establish appropriate supervision.
The Judge made the following observations:-
In my judgement the arrangements created by ELMS Solicitors and similar operators have the potential to undermine the integrity of the legal system. To allow unqualified persons to routinely represent parties in Court if they cannot properly be said to be supervised and are not accountable to any regulated professional body is an unsafe practice and is not permitted by the Legal Services Act 2007. I doubt that Mr Razza has ever met Mr Shoreham-Lawson or ever had a proper supervision session with him. If I am wrong about that, then it is for Mr Shoreham-Lawson to satisfy the Court that he has a proper system of supervision in place. In paragraph 195 of the judgement of Lord Justice Brooke in Hollins v Russell, he says that the Court of Appeal would not wish to be prescriptive about the form which the supervision should take, provided that an appropriate system has been set up. The practice note from ELMS Legal says that all advocates having been accepted to take instructions are provided with the requisite letters of instruction, training and support and are required to provide comprehensive attendance notes for supervisory purposes. In my judgement, this paragraph is too light on detail. The Judge is entitled to be re-assured that a proper system of supervision is in place before he permits an unqualified advocate to address him. I have no idea how many unqualified advocates are supervised by Mr Shoreham- Lawson. It could be dozens or even hundreds. I have no idea of how Mr Shoreham- Lawson arranges training and support for the advocates. He should provide sufficient information for the Court to be satisfied that the person appearing is entitled to an exemption. He has not done so in this case. I am therefore justified in not allowing Mr Razza rights of audience.
The Judge went on to consider the application for unreasonable conduct costs without hearing from Mr Razza. This article is limited to the issue of right of audience. Given the limited time remaining, the Judge reserved his judgment which was recently handed down.
Compared with DJ Pratt’s VCS Limited v Langley [2026]
As with VCS Limited v Langley, this is a county court first-instance decision that is not binding and, at best, would be persuasive. Even DDJ Mckay said, “although a decision at District Judge level is not binding on me, the judgment is a comprehensive analysis of the law and the issue.” As I’ve said previously, when the Court of Appeal decided that Halborg v Apple was ‘too academic’ to be considered despite HHJ Backhouse’s order to leapfrog the matter to the Court of Appeal, it would have led to the start of the collating of first-instance decisions and would become another ‘Battle of the transcripts2’.
It’s notable that the judge followed Judge Backhouse’s approach to what constitutes assisting in litigation, namely that advocacy falls within this category. I understand this principle well. Chamber advocacy typically involves case management hearings, including interim applications, which would qualify as assisting in the conduct of litigation since court involvement has advanced the matter.
Additionally, this aligns with the purpose of the schedule 3 exemption, which allows authorised persons to instruct unapproved employees to attend hearings on their behalf.
Imagine a solicitor or CILEX Lawyer (with the proper practice rights) in the office planning to handle a case management hearing. Suddenly, an urgent matter appears on their desk. They sigh heavily, then notice their paralegal walking by. They call the paralegal into their office and inform them that they will be going to court to handle the case management hearing. The paralegal is given instructions and provided with the case files to review before the hearing. Although the paralegal may not be directly involved in this specific case, they are assisting in the litigation process since the case management hearing is needed to assess progress.
The question of adequate evidence of supervision can be seen as an unnecessarily harsh criticism, akin to my issue with DJ Pratt when he suggested that there should be evidence of materially substantial assistance in the conduct of litigation.
Differences between the principal law firm and within the agency law firm
If the approach by McKay and Pratt were combined and adopted, it could be argued that those within the law firm directly representing the party (rather than those within the agency law firm instructed by the principal law firm) can establish prima facie that they were properly supervised and assisted in conducting the litigation.
Imagine tomorrow morning a District Judge begins to work through their list. The first hearing is a CMC and the Claimant is represented by counsel and the Defendant is represented by a paralegal within the law firm who are on record acting for the Defendant.
Prima facie, unless there was doubt that the paralegal actually worked at the law firm that is on record, there would be no reason to doubt that the paralegal was both appropriately supervised and assisting in the conduct of litigation. It would seem perverse that the supervisor would need to be present in court; otherwise, it would be counterintuitive to the purpose of the exemption. The supervisor would simply conduct the hearing themselves.
It would be unreasonable to use Pratt’s method to determine whether the paralegal has been assisting in the conducting of litigation because it would require evidence that this specific paralegal has helped in this case, such as by writing letters or signing documents. If McKay’s approach to assisting in conducting litigation is simply the process of conducting this particular type of advocacy.
Now, consider that the next hearing is a similar hearing where the Defendant is represented by an agent advocate from an agency law firm, following the same principle. It is fair to say that automatic prima facie adoption would not occur. However, based on my previous discussion about Langley, the agency law firm is regarded as the principal law firm, retaining both control and liability. Interestingly, that interpretation aligns with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur about the authorised individual who can delegate the task to a non-authorised individual.
ChatGPT and I had a bit of a falling out as I tried to carefully explain what I wanted, which was a visual illustration to demonstrate the above. After some back and forth, I got somewhere which broadly represents the above:-
In my view, it would seem that McKay was more willing to accept the possibility of agency advocacy (which is a bona fide service that has been around since the 1800s3), but absolutely wanted there to be the appropriate safeguards to ensure protection when it involved unauthorised advocates.
Concluding remarks
I think there is another particular issue regarding Sch 3 that could be quite a challenge. I intend to sit back, get the popcorn and see if that issue arises.
Without a binding authority, we will likely see ongoing inconsistency at the first instance and an increasing number of persuasive but non-binding decisions, culminating in a ‘battle of the transcripts’ on the rights of audience. It is not going to have the same impact or urgency as Mazur and the point regarding litigation, but I suspect that there will be many who will feel uneasy with the increased attention this issue is getting.
Information
Alec Hancock is a practising Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.
- The current situation is somewhat unclear. Previously, you couldn’t obtain litigation rights without also having chamber advocacy rights. This raises the question: if you are a CILEX Litigatory rights, can you supervise someone else’s litigation and allow them to use the Schedule 3 exemption? Additionally, a Fellow of CILEX without practice rights can participate in a small claims case without relying on the Schedule 3 exemption because PD27A para 3.1 grants them a right of audience on the small claims track, provided they are employed by a solicitor or someone authorised under the Legal Services Act 2007 to act as a litigator or advocate. This suggests that supervision might be possible if you only have litigation rights. I realise this has shifted from a footnote to a more personal stream of consciousness. Apologies for the digression…consider yourselves fortunate this isn’t in person, and you can’t stop me from talking! ↩︎
- I can’t claim to have ‘coined a phrase’ or copyright it, but I would like to think that when HHJ Saggerson adopted the phrase from me in his judgment of Aminu-Edu v Esure Insurance Company [2024] Lexis Citation 356, that has some authority to say it’s mine…. I suspect that has little weight. ↩︎
- Re Pomeroy & Tanner [1897] 1 CH 284, it should also be noted that when law firms renew their PII policies, when asked about the type of work they will be doing, an advocacy agency is an option. It’s not the advocacy agency that is the issue, but the use of unauhtorised advocates unless there is sufficient superivsion ↩︎