Category: AJH Advocacy

Martin Spencer J has had two judgments previously where the issues of fundamental dishonesty has arising. These cases are Richards & Anor v Morris [2018] EWHC 1289 (QB) and Molodi v Cambridge Vibration Maintenance Service & Anor [2018] EWHC 1288 (QB). In both of these cases, the Claimants have been found to have been fundamentally dishonest, stripping them of their costs protection afforded by Qualified One-Way Cost Shifting (“QOCS”).

Some cases end up going to trial because the Defendant believes there is a real prospect of establishing that the Claimant is being fundamentally dishonest. I do not think that there is anyone within the personal injury that is not alive to the fact that fraud exists, but there are many occasions where Claimants are clearly being dragged to a trial, put through the cross examination and are clearly honest.

A common denominator is the incorrect information within the Claims Notification Form (‘CNF’), which leads to the Claimant having the contents of the CNF being used to controvert their credibility.

Claims Notification Form

For those not familiar with low-value personal injury claims, a CNF is the document produced in lieu of a Letter of Claim to be sent to an insurer or defendant when making a claim of less than £25,000. It is part of a process designed to make small claims faster, clearer, and cheaper. The CNF is completed online through the MOJ Portal and will provide the necessary information for a Defendant or insurer to understand the case against them.

This has also been adopted by the Official Injury Claims procedure, with a Small Claims Notification Form (‘SCNF’). Both the CNFs and SCNFs contain statements of truth.

Statement of Truth

The statement of truth is an important endorsement of the CNF, with both the CNFs and SCNFs adopting the Part 22 wording:-

I am the claimant’s legal representative. The claimant believes that the facts stated in this claim form are true. The claimant understands that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. I am duly authorised by the claimant to sign this statement

The claimant believes that the facts stated in this Small Claim Notification form are true. The claimant understands that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a Statement of Truth without an honest belief in its truth.

I am duly authorised by the claimant to sign on their behalf.

Impact on credibility

Many Claimants are unaware that their CNFs are being submitted to the Defendant with errors that can be fatal to their credibility. Even if errors are later fixed, inconsistencies with later evidence can be used by the Defendant to question the Claimant’s credibility, which could lead to the claim being dismissed. Worst-case scenario, it can even go as far as to suggest that the Claimant is exaggerating or that the mistake was deliberate, which can lead to a finding of fundamental dishonesty.

In the case of Morris, Martin Spencer J reversed the trial judge’s decision to award damages despite the finding of the Claimants being ‘hopelessly inconsistent’. In respect of the CNFs, there were inconsistencies, such as medical attendances when there were none. The trial judge found that the CNFs were simplistic documents, but Martin Spencer J said the following:-

I interpose to make two comments about CNFs generally. Firstly, CNFs are important documents because not only are they the first notification of a claim to the potential defendant’s insurer in low value personal injury claims in road traffic accidents where the damages sought are between £1,000 – £25,000 but also they will often be the basis for early settlement of the claim. Thus, a claim may go no further than the submission of a CNF and an offer of settlement based on it, which is accepted. 

Secondly, and linked to the first point, the statement of truth is thus important as it means, or should mean, that the insurer can rely on the accuracy of the contents of the CNF in assessing the damages and any offer of compensation to be made. Where the statement of truth is signed by a claims manager on the claimants’ behalf, as here, the insurer trusts the claims manager and, through him or her, the firm of solicitors to have taken proper instructions and to have verified the accuracy of the contents of the document. It is worth remembering the provisions of the practice direction to Part 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules which states: 

“3.8 Where a legal representative has signed a statement of truth, his signature will be taken by the court as a statement – 

1) that the client on whose behalf he has signed and has authorised him to do so, 

2) that before signing he had explained to the client that in signing the statement of truth he would be confirming the client’s belief that the facts stated in the document are true

3) that before signing he had informed the client of the possible consequences to the client if it should subsequently appear that the client did not have an honest belief in the truth of those facts.”

CPR 32.14, relating to false statements, provides that “proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.” 

For the above reasons, I cannot associate myself with the comment made by HHJ Main QC at paragraph 42 of his judgment where, referring to CNFs, he said: 

“I do not find them reliable documents. They are done shortly. They are all very summarised. They are simplistic documents which do not permit there to be details of clinical presentation that can be relied upon by a trial judge and I just ignore them.“

On the contrary, in my view they are important documents: they provide the basis for possible proceedings for contempt of court, as seen, and they provide valuable information at an early stage in the litigation process. Endorsed with a statement of truth, as they are, CNFs should be reliable documents and should be taken seriously.

A similar determination was made in Molodi, where in the CNF, the Claimant claimed that he had not taken time off work and did not seek medical attention. However, his evidence at trial was that he did take time off work and had told the medico-legal expert that he had attended his GP surgery.

The trial Judge found that some injury was suffered by Claimant and awarded damages. He went on to say the following in respect of the CNF:-

“I have hardly seen a Claim Notification Form in the last number of years where the detail of the accident as I found it on the evidence, often on objective evidence, is properly recorded in the Claims Notification Form. The process itself is often, because of its nature, littered with inaccuracy, partly because the forms are filled out by relatively lowly junior people in the office who are not qualified, partly because they do not take sufficient care over setting out the details and sometimes as they type it up they make mistakes. I see it in almost every case. The fact that there is no mention made of the right hand does not of itself concern me. The other injuries are broadly referred to.”

Martin Spencer J, allowing the Defendant’s appeal, said that the claim was riddle with inconsistencies, referring to both the points raised in the CNF but other evidence presented in the claim.

Discussion

An inconsistent CNF can be a powerful tool for a Defendant to argue fundamental dishonesty, as it offers early, documented evidence of the Claimant’s assertions bound by a statement of truth. Discrepancies between the CNF and later evidence can suggest exaggeration or lying. Courts recognise the CNF as the claimant’s initial and verified version of events, so inconsistencies may undermine credibility. However, discrepancies do not automatically prove dishonesty; errors can result from misunderstandings, clerical mistakes, or involvement of third parties like solicitors. While a flawed CNF can support a fundamental dishonesty argument, it must be considered alongside all evidence. With cases like Morris and Molodi, there were a significant number of inconsistencies beyond those presented in the CNF.

Inconsistencies between the CNF and medical report often prompt a Defendant to argue that causation has not been established, and in some cases, it may lead to allegations of fundamental dishonesty. An accurate CNF is crucial to minimising risks. Solicitors should consider that laypeople might not fully understand how symptoms are described or presented. Relying on a Claimant to complete the CNF could result in mischaracterisations, which might inadvertently steer the case toward a contentious trial. 

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

As post-1st October 2023 fixed costs cases are increasingly reaching trial, advocates and litigators are becoming more acquainted with the new fixed recoverable cost regime, which differs in some aspects from the pre-1st October 2023 regime.

I represented a Defendant at a non-pi RTA Fast Track trial, where I was successful in having the claim dismissed. My opponent and I were able to agree on the costs quite easily, but there was a discussion as to what would have happened if the Claimant had succeeded because quantum had been agreed, subject to liability, at a sum far less than the pleaded amount.

I was going to argue that the Claimant was restricted to a trial advocacy fee reflected by the awarded amount and not the pleaded amount. My opponent said that under the new Part 45 fixed recoverable costs regime, there was no scope to make such a submission.

Pre 1st-October 2023 regime

The trial advocacy fees were lower in the pre 1st-October 2023 Part 45 regime, but they also had a different formula to calculating the correct trial advocacy fee:-

It is clear that the trial advocacy fee is based on the level of damages ‘agreed or awarded’. If the matter had been subject to the pre-1st October 2023 regime, there would be no dispute. However, the issue comes about because the wording in the post-1st October 2023 regime is different.

Post-1st October 2023 regime

In Practice Direction 45, the Fast Track Table gives the following trial advocacy formula:-

The use of ‘the value of the claim‘ is potentially devastating for Defendants who successfully reduce the value of a claim, but still have a judgment against them. Why should the Claimant get a windfall because a claim has been valued at X but Y is awarded, which would impact the trial advocacy fee.

The Defendant might look at CPR 45.6 and consider how the rules expressly calculates the Defendant’s costs:-

45.6.—(1) Where, in any case to which Section VI, Section VII or Section VIII of this Part applies, the court makes an order for costs in favour of the defendant, the allowable costs are—

(a)the fixed costs set out in Section VI, Section VII or Section VIII;

(b)the applicable disbursements set out in Section IX of this Part.

(2) For the purpose of assessing or determining the costs payable to a defendant by reference to the fixed costs in Table 12 and Table 14—

(a)“value of the claim for damages” and “damages” shall be treated as references to the value of the claim, as defined in paragraph (3); and

(b)if the claim is discontinued, a reference in Table 12 or Table 14 to the stage at which a case is settled shall be treated as a reference to the stage at which the case is discontinued.

(3) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(a), ‘the value of the claim’ is—

(a)the amount specified in the claim form, without taking into account any deduction for contributory negligence, but excluding—

(i)any amount not in dispute;

(ii)interest; or

(iii)costs;

(b)if no amount is specified in the claim form, the maximum amount which the claimant reasonably expected to recover according to the statement of value included in the claim form under rule 16.3;

(c)if the claim form states that the claimant cannot reasonably say how much is likely to be recovered—

(i)£25,000 in a claim to which Section VI applies; or

(ii)£100,000 in a claim to which Section VII applies;

(d)if the claim has no monetary value—

(i)the applicable amount in rule 45.45(1)(a)(ii) in a claim to which Section VI applies; or

(ii)the applicable amount in rule 45.50(2)(b)(ii) in a claim to which Section VII applies; or

(e)if a claim includes both a claim for monetary relief and a claim which has no monetary value, the applicable amount in sub-paragraph (d) taken together with the applicable monetary value in sub-paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

It is very odd that PD45 would have the description of the “value of the claim” for calculating the quantum of the trial advocacy, but require the Defendant to have CPR 45.6 to specifically define “value of the claim” as the value on the Claim Form.

Discussion

One can describe elements of Part 45 as a self-contained set of rules intended to give certainty. Either the rules give you the ability to do something or they do not. My opponent seemed to suggest that, as the description in PD45 was ‘value of the claim’, with no description of what value of the claim meant for a Claimant, it had to be taken literally.

There is a lot of force in that argument. However, it would make sense that Defendants in Part 45.6 having a specific definition would insinuate that the value claim does not mean the value of the claim in the claim form. 

I have not yet had it tested, but my opponent mentioned that, to date, the Court has only once found that the claimant’s trial advocacy fee was based on the value, and not the related case.

Given that some pre-1st October 2023 Part 45 rules have only started to be tested, it won’t be surprising if there remains an absence of any helpful authority on this issue for some time, if at all.

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

I won’t sugarcoat it; these past few weeks have been a nightmare for CILEX Fellows. They feel disillusioned and let down by our regulator, which is quite genuinely attempting to gaslight its members into saying they have never given the advice that litigation by supervision was possible. CILEX Fellows clearly hold evidence that proves CILEX was giving out such advice, and the regulator doubles down…

“The Party told you to reject the evidence of your eyes and ears. It was their final, most essential command.” George Owell’s 1984

Whilst I am fortunate not to be in that position, the number of worried, upset and stressed fellow CILEX Fellows who have been in contact with me and discussed their concerns makes me thing about how stressed everyone probably is right now.

I also saw how supportive every CILEX Fellow has been of each other and other members of the legal industry. Whilst the few will use this to continue to make derogatory comments about CILEX, I have seen the vast majority support CILEX Fellows…. Thank you to those who have. To those employers who have reassured their CILEX Fellows and those who have immediately taken steps to assist in CILEX Fellows obtaining practice rights.

I wish I could do more, but beyond the advice already shared, there isn’t much. Instead, I decided to write a quick post with a simple method for making comforting food that anyone can enjoy — a healthier, hearty recipe for pancakes. These are real fluffy American pancakes, not crepes.

Years ago, I used this recipe, which “syn free” is the reference to Weight Watchers syns, used to help indicate better food types.

Ingredients

The ingredients can be halved. However, as I am due to go on a long dog walk and I want as much energy as possible, I am going to use the full recipe:-

• 80 grams of porridge oats (use Ready Brek if you don’t want to stand around bending; they are already reduced to the perfect size)
• 4 eggs
• 95 grams of fat free yoghurt (6 tablespoons)
• 20 grams of granulated sweetener (1.5 tablespoons)
• 10 grams of vanilla essence (2 teaspoons)
• 5 grams of baking power (1 teaspoons)

Method

The porridge oats need to be blended to the extent that they are less like oats and more like sawdust. This is why Ready Brek, whilst being a brand name and being brand prices, takes a lot of the stress away. If you are going to go for store brands, make sure they are finely blended.

Add all the ingredients into a bowl and mix until you get a smooth batter. That’s literally what it says, haha. The recipe suggests letting it sit for 10-15 minutes to thicken. I’ve sometimes prepared it 1-2 hours ahead, covered the bowl with cling film, and kept it in the fridge. When you’re ready to cook, just let it warm up to near room temperature.

This is why I am recommending it. Really simple, easy to make. The sweetener and vanilla essence adds the flavour.

Once the mixture is ready to be used, have the pan on a medium heat (too hot will cause it to burn). I use a soup spoon to get the portion sizes correct. Multiple smaller pancakes are better for structural integrity. I also use the back of the spoon to carefully spread the batter evenly. When you can safely move the pancake on the pan, you can toss the pancake to do the other side (or be sensible and use the spatula to turn it over).

Really straightforward and very tasty. You won’t believe they were made from Ready Brek oats.

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

As the impact of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB)  applied to Fellows without practice rights, in addition to those unqualified fee earners, because the High Court determined that the Legal Services Act 2007 did not grant a right to conduct litigation by way of supervision by someone who is authorised to conduct litigation, which meant that although CILEX Fellows are regulated lawyers, if they don’t have the right to conduct litigation, then they could conduct litigation in the employ of law firm.

I wrote an article on this basis that many CILEX Fellows may not appreciate the impact of Mazur on those without the right to conduct litigation. Not only did I nto expect over 2000 views on the page, I’ve been hit up by many of you who are concerned and want to apply for practice rights ASAP. Rather than try to respond to everyone at once I am write this article to hoepfully give you guidance on what you need to do.

Forgive me, it’s been five years since I made the application. So please do not take everything I say as accurate.

The application form and hand book

You’ll need to download this form, which seems to be the most recent. It’s the document you see at the very top. It is also worth downloading the handbook for your area of law:-

• Civil Litigation
• Criminal Litigation
• Family Litigation

For ease, I am going to use the civil litigation example. You need only look at the criminal/family equivalent in the logbook. Realistically, if in doubt, read the handbook – it quite literally tells you everything about what each part requires.

Part 1 – Personal Injury and Area of Practice

Nice and easy, complete with your details and tick the box relevant to your practice area.

Part 2: Knowledge and understanding

You must be able to demonstrate at least Level 6 in civil litigation and either law of tort or contract law. The minimum qualification is, of course, your CILEX qualifications or your LLB/LPC/BVC. You will need your certificates/transcript, which you can obtain from CILEX (or at least the former if it’s a CILEX qualification).

You must also complete three portolios using Annex 2. You don’t even need to go on to the CILEX Regulation website to find “Annex 2 Experience” logbook, i’ve done it for you by clicking here. I even include the link to an example. They are also at the end of the form after a checklist fo wha tyou need to provide logbook-wise.

Part 3: experience

Even though there may be questions as to whether litigation could have or should have been conducted by virtue of supervision, you are expected to provide details of your work history over the last five years and then submit a portfolio of three cases that you have undertaken.

I would use a separate document rather than trying to fill in that box. Just title it “Part three experience”.

Part 4: Skills

This is the most faffiest part because whilst you most certainly going to have a client care and legal research exemption, the skills section of the handbook may or may not be exempted from other qualifications you may have. It is likely to be easier if you demonstrate with a redacted logbook.

For clarity, it is likely that the only exemption you can demonstrate is the client care and legal research.

This is the logbook. This is an example of it completed. It’s the most time consuming part. The elements you need to cover is in the handbook:-

There are 6 elements:-

• Element 1 – Interviewing, advising and communicating
• Element 2 – Costs and funding
• Element 3 – Conduct and ethics
• Element 4 – Managing litigation work
• Element 5 – Settlement v litigation
• Element 6 – Legal writing and drafting

You will see that each logbook entry hits the learning outcome and the various bullet-points are what you are required to evidence. Essentially, you need only do 18 logbooks (there may be more or less for the family or criminal). Yes, it’s a lot but it’s really not compared with the fellowship portfolio. You can do it!

Part five: Knowledge, understanding, experience and skills (practice managment and accounts).

Are you practising in a CILEX Entity? If the answer is ‘no’ then skip this as it only applies if you intend to practice in a law firm, regulated by CILEX. If you are, I recommend that you contact Giles Probert at CILEX Regulation, as he will assist you in overcoming this element.

Part 6: Membership of professional organisation and conduct statement

If you have a membership to any non-CILEX organisations, then include this. Don’t worry if you don’t.

Prior Conduct

You will know this section by now, for every time you renew your certificate. Just complete it as normal.

Part Seven: Advocacy

You tick the appropriate rights you wish to seek. However, if you are already a CILEX Advocate, then you don’t need to complete this. If you have a BVC you should also be exempt from this (put it in your covering letter).

You then complete an Annexe 4 document talking about your advocacy experience. Then, you must do a three-advocacy portfolio demonstrating experience to date (criminal advocates use a different annexe 6 for police station attendances). The Annex 5 advocacy logbook is here and here is an example one.

Part 8 References and Declarations

Two references. The handbook says the following:-

This part of the application asks you to provide details of two legal professionals who have knowledge of your work and are willing to provide a reference for you. The legal professionals should be authorised persons or members of the judiciary. An authorised person is defined in section 18 of the Legal Services Act 2007 as a solicitor, barrister, CILEx Practitioner, CILEx Fellow, Licensed Conveyancer, Patent Agent, Trade Mark Attorney, Costs Lawyer or Notarial Agent.

That’s it.. the rest is just signing the document.

What happens once CILEX Regulation approve?

You will be told that Altior will be issued with a ‘certificate of eligibility’, which allows you to liaise with Altior to arrange to join the course. Mike Winston is the usual advocacy trainer but he has said on linkedin that it now runs approximately three times a year and they will if needbe increase the number of training sessions available.

I’ve passed the course, now what?

Contact CILEX Regulation at practicerights@cilexregulation.org.uk. They will send you a form to complete.

Remember, after the first year, you will need to do a new form to show that you’ve done three examples of exercising your right of audience. Once you have it, your certification remains indefinitely – no need to renew again (and you become eligible to apply for higher rights if you ever wanted to).

Honestly, just read the handbook; it tells you how to complete each section and looks at the examples. You cannot go wrong.

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

Last week I was contacted by a CILEX Fellow who was concerned that she could not hold a case load in her name without having a litigation certificate. After discussing the matter at length, we both scowered the Legal Services Act 2007.

The following week, the case of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) was handed down, making it entirely clear for that CILEX Fellow about her position was as a fee earner.

The implications is that CILEX Fellows without practice rights can become partners in law firms, Judges and even charge Grade A for work, but can only assist those who are authorised to conduct litigation.

The question is then, what can CILEX Fellow do going forward?

The Mazur case

The appellants (Mazur & Stuart) we said to have owed unpaid legal fees and Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (GBS) sued them for debt on behalf of CRS LLP. Peter Middleton, GBS’s Head of Commercial Litigation, drafted and signed the claim form, but was not an authorised person with a practising certificate allowing him to conduct litigation. 

The appellants claimed Mr Middleton was unlawfully conducting litigation, a “reserved legal activity” under the Legal Services Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”). A county court judge initially stayed the case; HHJ Simpkiss later lifted the stay, accepting that the matter eventually made it to the High Court upon appeal. 

The appellants argued that Section 21(3) LSA did not allow employees of authorised firms to conduct litigation, even under supervision. They argued that only authorised or exempt persons can do this and the work that Mr Middleton’s undertook (such as drafting, filing, serving documents, correspondence, and issuing proceedings) went beyond assisting and was in fact conducting litigation.

It was argued by the respondents that it was accepted practice for Mr Middleton to act under supervision. They argued that, according to Section 21(3), employees of authorised firms were allowed to carry out reserved activities. They relied on the basis that SRA had confirmed that Mr Middleton’s role was permitted under supervision.

The Law Society and the SRA, as interveners, made submissions that employees can support authorised solicitors in litigation but cannot conduct litigation themselves unless they are specifically authorised or exempt. They said that Section 21(3) pertained to regulatory authority rather than individual authorisation, reinforcing the principle that only qualified, authorised persons should conduct litigation to ensure public protection.

Sheldon J agreed with the appellants, Law Society and SRA’s interpretation.

What does this mean for those without the right to conduct litigation?

The Mazur Judgment removes any ambiguity that may have been taken from the 2007 Act, you must either be authorised to conduct litigation or be subject to an exemption (which either an Act grants them the power to conduct litigation or they were granted permission by a Court).

Essentially, this means that no steps should be carried out by fee earners who don’t have the right to conduct litigation that amounts to conducting litigation. This would include, but not be limited to, the following:-

• signing/sending legal documents
• making decisions with respect to the litigation

It probably did not assist that the SRA were giving guidance that supported the proposition that a fee earner, when under the appropriate supervision of an authorised individual, would be in keeping with the 2007 Act.

It essentially means that any work that non-authorised fee earners undertake must be exclusively be assisting the person authorised to conduct litigation. It would make sense that the person could give clear instructions to the non-authorised fee earner to draft a document. However, that document must be compeltely scrutinised by the authorised person and that person must put their name to the document so the speak and take sole ownership.

What does it mean for CILEX Fellows without practice rights?

It is now evidently clear that CILEX Fellows who do not hold independent practice rights are not permitted to conduct litigation, even if they are appropriately supervised.

There is a striking juxtaposition for them; CILEX Fellows without practice rights are prohibited from conducting litigation, yet they may sit as judges, become partners in law firms, and charge at Grade A fee-earner rates.

Without litigation practice rights, for all intents and purposes, a CILEX Fellow can support litigation work under the supervision of an authorised person, but they cannot themselves take on the role of conducting proceedings.

The vast majority of CILEX Fellows are legacy Fellows, meaning that when they qualified, they were only granted the rights of a commissioner of oaths. The news CILEX Professional Qualification (CPQ) process will now ensure that those in litigation qualify with practice rights.

Otherwise, they must apply for practice rights. Currently, Fellows can only get litigation rights through CILEX Regulation by seeking practice rights. These rights allow them to handle legal cases, be recorded as the legal representative in court, and represent clients in certain courts depending on their rights. There are three main types of litigation rights: civil, criminal, and family. To get these rights, CILEX Fellows must demonstrate their knowledge, skills, and experience through portfolios or assessments. Once approved, they become authorised litigators with the same standing as solicitors for those rights.

The current issue for many is that the advocacy course is expensive and a deterrent for many and due to the limited applicants, the advocacy course is not running that often. CILEX Regulation has just finished a consultation on litigation-only practice rights. This is something that may take some time as it must be sought from the Legal Services Board. Given that it took some time for the higher rights of audience to be authorised, it would not surprise me if it takes another 6-12 months.

….and in the meantime?

It is difficult to say what firms should do. Many firms (and I know many) where none of the documents are signed by the fee earner, decisions are deferred to a supervisor, and whilst the fee earner may be a point of contact, they do not necessarily run the case.

Strictly speaking, your law firm will no doubt take steps to ensure your work is compliant with the 2007 Act. However, I would strongly recommend that practice rights are obtained, and this will most certainly now be a suitable justification for your law firm to invest what is a relatively small sum to allow you to conduct litigation. Click here for a slightly updated version of the Pros and Cons of apply for CILEX practice rights.

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

Well, August seems to be the month of illness for me. I’m not used to being ill and I’m not used to sitting still and doing nothing. I’ve really had to slow down and make sure I look after myself so that when I work, I give 100%.

This time, instead of trying a recipe I found online, I revisited my notes from Philleigh Way Cookery School to make some focaccia. Philleigh Way is a wonderful cookery school run by Rupert Cooper, a former rugby player and a great guy. A few years ago, I booked a cookery lesson for a birthday, during which I received this recipe from him. Since it’s his recipe, I’ve chosen not to publish a step-by-step guide. However, if you’re near Cornwall or Truro, I highly recommend trying it out.

The bread is addictive and easy to make. The rosemary gives it that pleasant fragrance as you bite into it.

Depending on my busyness, I will either write a new article or recycle a previous one with some comments on changes.May you all have a good start to the new week.

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

I was recently instructed to attend an OIC quantum hearing on behalf of a Defendant insurer where the tariff award was agreed at £260 but the Claimant had put forward a non-tariff injury proposal of £1,237.60. The twist was that this was not a claim for non-tariff PSLA; it was a claim for company sick pay which the Claimant was required to claim and repay to his employer.

My client had said the following on the portal:-

As per the Pre Action Protocol 8.3 List of Losses (3) The claimant will not be able to add further items on the Portal, once they indicate they are ready to settle the claim. This was not set out in your clients list of losses and you also provided a signed list of losses without the loss of earnings. therefore we have no offers to make

Where as the Claimant’s solicitors said:-

Employers RSP – evidence uploaded.

Submitted under non-tariff section as portal does not have field to enter employers recoverable sick pay.

My instructions were that the Claimant indicated that they were to settle and then, upon realising their mistake, had decided to utilise the non-tariff section to get around para 8.3 of the Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims below the Small Claims Limit in Road Traffic Accidents (‘the RTA SC Protocol’).

The evidence

There was a schedule that had been prepared by the Claimant’s Solicitors that replicated the list of losses and Court Valuation Form. This included the medical report fee but no other losses. It was signed with a statement of truth by the Claimant himself.

There was a letter from the Claimant’s employer. It predated the aforementioned schedule and gave information of a breakdown of what was said to have been paid by the employer to the Claimant during his absence.

I argued that the signed schedule, with no reference to the loss was indicative of not trying to find an appropriate section for the loss to be pleaded under, but that it was overlooked and not pleaded at the relevant time before indicating the willness to settle as per para 8.3

The law

I argued that, similar to previous low-value protocols, the RTA SC Protocol is a self-contained set of rules designed to provide certainty to parties. The prescriptive language clearly indicates when steps must be taken or are optional, allowing parties to decide whether to proceed.

Para 8.2 explained that “the Claimant must also ensure that all items of other protocol damages have been included in the online “List of Losses” on the Portal and that this is verified with a statement of truth, as set out in paragraph 8.3 below” and that the Claimant had the option to indicate they were not ready to settle even if they choose upload the medical report (which they were not obligated to do so).

I draw an analogous comparison to the prescriptive nature of Part 36, using Gibson v Manchester City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 726 as an example where Part 36 is described as a standalone code, explaining how to make offers and what happens afterwards. Its rules aim for clear, predictable outcomes, especially since many people handle their own cases. It should be read as written, without adding other legal rules unless clearly intended.

The hearing

The Judge indicated she had read my skeleton argument. It was agreed that the issue should be dealt with as a preliminary issue. I also agreed that, as we were asserting, I would make submissions first

My opponent maintained the proposition that the Claimant could not put the loss in any of the prescribed heads of loss. The Judge was very much of the view that “injury – other losses’ head was appropriate as a ‘capture all other’ losses that would fit into any other category. My opponent submitted that it was not analogous with Part 36 and in fact, there was no good reason why the Court could not accept the head of loss. She then indicated that if the Judge was not with her then she would be making a relief from sanction application.

In response, I agreed with the judge that there was a catch-all heading for losses. I reiterated that it would appear from the signed schedule that they simply either did not notice it or forgot about the company sick pay claim, and then when they went to submit it, they realised that error and attempted to circumvent it by adding it as a non-tariff injury.

I disagreed with my opponent’s suggestion that it was not analogous with Part 36. For example, I pointed out that counteroffers did not reject previous offers as would be expected in the common law of contract. That’s because Part 36 was self-contained. I said the same type of rules applied in the OIC portal. I submitted that the court did not have the jurisdiction to consider the head of loss. 

The Judge found in my favour. She found the Claimant had fallen into error when initiating its intention to settle by not including the employer company sick pay claim (which, of course, was not disputed to be a legitimate head of loss) in any of the possible heads of loss and, in any doubt the ‘other loss’ catagory. In failing to do so, the Claimant was in breach of para 8.3. The Claimant could not just insert it under non-tariff injury.

Relief from sanctions application

Understandably, my opponent did her best to try and salvage the situation and made a relief application. She argued that in all the circumstances, this was a slight misunderstanding with severe consequences, that if relief wasn’t granted, then the whiplash award would be given to the employers under the T&Cs of his employment contract and would be out of pocket. She also argued that there was no prejudice to the Defendant as it had the evidence for many months.

I attempted to argue that the relief application had no jurisdiction because it was in respect of a CPR rule, PD or Court Order. This was a pre-action protocol which, whilst self-contained and enforced compliance, was not subject to CPR 3.9. The Judge disagreed with this, as I had just argued that there was a rule that had been breached and therefore the Court did have jurisdiction. I went on to argue the application was made late, no evidence and that the Court cannot hand out relief like smarties simply because there is no prejudice. The Claimant’s Solicitors could be subject to a claim by teh Claimant so there was some redress.

The application was refused, the issue fee and solicitors’ costs on issue were not allowed, but also, my application for my costs of attending was not allowed as it didn’t meet the threshold of CPR 27.14(2)(g).

Remarks

Some might argue that this outcome is overly harsh and that, regardless of the specific loss category, there was a claim for the employer’s company sick pay in the court valuation form with supporting evidence. However, the payslips did not indicate any use of company sick pay to cover the Claimant’s income during the relevant months, and the only evidence was a letter from the employer confirming they had paid sick pay. Clearly, the Claimant did not adhere to the protocol’s rules in this claim.

The Claimant’s solicitors could have demonstrated that they had already included this type of loss in the non-tariff injury section before expressing their willingness to settle on the OIC portal. I believe the result might have been entirely different if the schedule prepared by the solicitors had listed the company sick pay, as this would suggest an intention to include that loss before negotiations began.

Instead, it showed the markings of solicitors who clearly made a mistake but tried to correct it by listing it as a non-tariff injury. I find this approach absurd, especially since there was a broad category of loss, and often special damages can be misclassified under incorrect headings for special damages. 

As with any county court decision, this is non-binding and not reported or a copy obtained, but it reiterates the same approach to other protocols and rules. If a rule tells you to do something, you must do it. If it does not, you cannot. do it. 

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

This is a different article from the usual ones. It has absolutely nothing to do with law or the legal profession! I think, going forward, I am going to post every now and then about things we can do to chill out and recharge.

I recently became so run-down that I couldn’t even swallow a drink with a horrible sensation in my throat. Turns out it was tonsillitis. It really hit home the importance of looking after oneself. After all, how can you help others with their oxygen mask if you haven’t put on your own?

On Saturday I decided to do something I haven’t done in a while. Baking. I love cooking generally. I find it so therapeutic and relaxing after a long day (which is ironic, because many find it stressful). It’s not something that i’ve done in a while and other than baking bread (especially focaccia), baking a cake is not something I would usually do.

So I decided to use this as an excuse to do a step-by-step guide of Nigella’s Clementine Cake, and her website includes the recipe.

I started by making a baking paper circle for the bottom of the baking tin.

I cheated, of course, and found a method online of creating a circle by carefully folding the paper into a triangle. You can then place the point in the middle of the circular tray, trim the edge and then you are left with a relatively perfect circle.

I then buttered the base and inside of the baking tin casing, before carefully putting in the circle baking paper.

Nigella’s recipe instructs boiling the four clementines for several hours, but the footnotes suggest microwaving as an alternative. That’s what I chose to do.

I got my mixing bowl, adding the ground almonds….

… then I added the sugar….

… then the baking power (the person I was baking for requires gluten free, so this was the ‘free from’ brand of baking powder)….

I then mixed it thoroughly to ensure all ingredients were evenly combined.

The clementines were now soft and durable. I slid them open (just in case there were seeds) and removed the dark stems from the clementines.

I started by adding only the clementines and blending them, which made it easier for the large skin pieces to break down, although microwave/boiling also assisted with this process.

I then added the ground almond/sugar/baking powder mixture slowly, followed by the six eggs.

Once I was satisfied the mixture was apporpriately mixed, I prepared the tin ready to pour the mixture in.

Nigella’s recipe says to put tin foil over the tin around 40 minutes after going into the oven, which I would say I just about got away with.

I performed the ‘knife test’ to check for any remaining gooey mixture. It came out clean, so I just needed to wait until it cooled enough to remove it carefully from the tin.

You don’t need anything with it, like cream, butuse nothing thicker than single cream. It’s wonderfully moist, with a perfectly balanced clementine flavour. As mentioned earlier, this is an excellent gluten-free choice. I’m unsure if there’s an egg substitute to make it vegan, but those interested could explore options. if you prefer,

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

I was recently instructed by solicitors to assist an individual who was being pursued by a mortgage company. He denied that there was any outstanding debt on the mortgage after the property was sold, and, being savvy as he was, noted that the proceedings were issued after the 12-year limitation period. He set this out in his defence, and he was met with an application for either a strike-out or summary judgment for the Claimant.

The end result was that the Claimant discontinued and agreed to pay my client’s costs. However, there was an unnecessarily drawn-out dispute because the Claimant believed that they had a defence to the limitation defence.

Claimant’s application

When I was supplied with the Claimant’s application I could see that the Claimant (amongst other things) suggested that my client had acknowledged the debt and relied on a field agent’s report where there was an alleged conversation in August 2019.

What they were relying on was section 29 of the Limitation Act 1980, which creates a fresh accrual of the limitation period if the debtor acknowledges the debt. For a mortgage (as per s20), this was 12 years. If this was correct, the limitaiton defence would be defeated.

The report was actually from 2023, not 2019, and it confirmed that the agent could not contact my client. Further, I noted that even if the agent did make contact with my client, it was insufficient as an acknowledgement of the debt as per s30 Limitaiton Act 1980:-

s30 Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments.

(1)To be effective for the purposes of section 29 of this Act, an acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person making it.

(2)For the purposes of section 29, any acknowledgment or payment—

(a)may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under that section; and

(b)shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.

I prepared a very brief skeleton argument, and on the afternoon before the hearing, my client received an additional application statement. This statement included a redacted telephone attendance note, supposedly from 2019, indicating that my client acknowledged the debt but was unable to start repayments. It also suggested payments were being made up to a certain date.

First hearing

The Judge considered the Claimant’s supplementary witness statement and provided an initial indication that, even if the payments were made by the Defendant (which was both denied and unclear from the documentation whether these payments originated from him), the limitation period from the last payment had expired before proceedings were issued.

My opponent was asked whether the telephone attendance note was intended to be relied on as a written acknowledgment of the debt. My opponent confirmed the same.

The Judge then turned to me. He had not received my skeleton argument. Nevertheless, I set out the basis for my argument that, while an agent with some general authority could acknowledge the debt on behalf of a debt, it must be in writing and signed.

I pointed out that the agent cannot be a stranger to my client, and we do not even know who the author of the telephone attendance note was. It wasn’t signed and therefore did not meet the requirements of s30. I submitted that there was no defence to the limitation defence and that the Court ought to exercise its power to dispose of the matter and find summary Judgment for the Claimant.

The Judge initially questioned my point, but I explained that Clerk & Lindsell would say that the issue of limitation could be dealt with in a preliminary hearing. I said there was no good reason not to dispose of it today.

The Judge was reluctant to dispense with the claim at that hearing and ordered a preliminary hearing on liability, with the Claimant’s application to be adjourned in case the limitation defence failed. He also ordered skeleton arguments to be filed and served within 14 days and reserved costs. He made it clear that he was dubious whether the Court could be convinced that this amounted to a written acknowledgment. I would say this was more than a judicial eyebrow raise.

My client and I could not see how the Claimant would be able to succeed and my client decided to make a without prejudice Calderbank for the Claimant to discontinue and for the parties to bear costs. This was to expire shortly before the skeleton argument deadline.

Skeleton Arguments

With no response to my client calderbank offer, I draftered a more comprehensive skeleton argument. I set out how:-

• The various types of written acknowledgement that would be acceptable
• What amounts to an acknowledgement
• Who can make the acknowledgement
• What is sufficient to amount to a signature

I set out the basis of my submission, that this telephone attendance coudl never be an acknowledgement in accordance with s30.

The document was a telephone note from the Claimant. The alleged acknowledgement was reportedly made during a phone call between the Claimant and my client, which was oral rather than written. The author of the telephone note cannot be considered my client’s agent, as they were a stranger to him. Only someone who is purported to be my client’s agent and has general authority to acknowledge the debt could provide a written acknowledgement. Such an acknowledgement would need to be in writing and signed. Since the telephone note is unsigned and the author cannot be identified, it cannot be sufficient.

Even more surprising was that the Claimant sought an extension on filing and serving its skeleton argument. My client offered 7 days. Those seven days passed with no skeleton argument.

Preliminary hearing and compromise

The day before the hearing, our cost schedules had been served, and then, out of nowhere, the Claimant began to negotiate the discontinuance of their claim. My client stood firm and sought for more of his legal fees to be paid. The agreement took place after 5 pm so both parties agreed that the advocates would attend to file the consent Order (given that I was already there).

It would seem that the new Judge (a family practitioner DDJ) was asking the ushers to speak to my opponent for her skeleton argument. Once it became apparent that we had settled, the Judge brought us in. She indicated that she had already read my skeleton argument (which she said was very helpful) and then apologised for chasing my opponent for a skeleton argument as she was not aware of the compromise.

Comments

This was clearly a case where someone had made an error and not taken steps to issue proceedings in time. At that point, upon realising that there was nothing that would amount to a s29 acknowledgement, the matter should have been left there.

However, the Claimant fee earner issues proceedings on behalf of their client and receives the limitation defence. The fee earner should have been alive to the fact that there was a limitation defence and upon reason s29 and s30, should have been aware that no defence to the limitation defence exists. Instead, the applied for a strike out/summary judgment.

The Claimant’s counsel returns from the hearing and reports the judicial eyebrow raise. The Claimant fee earner receives my client’s calderbank. Why is it that at no point the Claimant has seriously considered that they had no defence to the limitation defence?

It made me wonder. My client was very savvy. How many Defendants had claims brought against them out of time, unaware of the limitation defence and without raising it in their defence, the claim proceeded? Is this why the fee earner (potentially part of a dedicated team dealing with mortgage claims) was completely unaware of what it means for an acknowledgement of the debt within the meaning of s29 of the 1980 Act? Was it simply the case that once the mistake was made, someone somewhere buried their head in the sand and hoped for the best?

Whilst my client was very much confident in his defence, there was a lot of unnecessary stress which has finally been lifted. It should have been lifted sooner. It should never have existed in the first place.

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.

Lately, I have been quite busy and haven’t managed to write a new article. However, this week I have two preliminary hearings concerning liability — one for a personal injury case and the other related to a mortgage.

The personal injury case concerns a matter that the Claimant claims exited the OIC, and therefore a N1 Claim Form was taken to the local court to be deemed ‘received’ to be brought within the meaning of PD27A. The Defendant raised the limitation defence, arguing that it was ‘served’ out of time and that the claim should have remained in the OIC portal. I am acting for the Claiamnt.

The mortgage case concerns a divorce where a husband and wife sold the property afterwards. The final order granted the remaining equity to the wife and the debt to the husband. After more than 12 years, proceedings were issued. It is claimed that the husband acknowledged the debt during a phone call, though he denies making such a call. The mortgage company contends that this acknowledgement, under s29, reset the limitation period. The husband contends that a telephone attendance note cannot amount to an acknowledgement of the debt. I am acting for the Defendant husband.

As I am unable to write anything new, please find links to previous limitation posts:-

• Limitation in Personal Injury – Tips and Tricks
• Limitation Defence in Personal Injury – the clue is in the name
• Setting aside Notice of Discontinuance – Think before you attempt to ‘pull the sword out’ in a personal injury case

Information 

AJH Advocacy Limited, a Limited Company which is regulated by the Bar Standards Boards (entity number 190758), ceases trading on the 12th January 2026. 

From the 12th January 2026 and onwards, Alec Hancock will practice as a Barrister at Magdalen Chambers in Exeter. For instructions on matters on or after 12th January 2026, please contact Magdalen Chambers via clerks@magdalenchambers.co.uk or by telephone on 01392 285 200.